Kernel two-sample testing is a useful statistical tool in determining whether data samples arise from different distributions without imposing any parametric assumptions on those distributions. However, raw data samples can expose sensitive information about individuals who participate in scientific studies, which makes the current tests vulnerable to privacy breaches. Hence, we design a new framework for kernel two-sample testing conforming to differential privacy constraints, in order to guarantee the privacy of subjects in the data. Unlike existing differentially private parametric tests that simply add noise to data, kernel-based testing imposes a challenge due to a complex dependence of test statistics on the raw data, as these statistics correspond to estimators of distances between representations of probability measures in Hilbert spaces. Our approach considers finite dimensional approximations to those representations. As a result, a simple chi-squared test is obtained, where a test statistic depends on a mean and covariance of empirical differences between the samples, which we perturb for a privacy guarantee. We investigate the utility of our framework in two realistic settings and conclude that our method requires only a relatively modest increase in sample size to achieve a similar level of power to the non-private tests in both settings.
Introduction
Several recent works suggest that it is possible to identify subjects that have participated in scientific studies based on publicly available aggregate statistics (cf. [19, 22] among many others). The differential privacy formalism [7] provides a way to quantify the amount of information on whether or not a single individual's data is included (or modified) in the data and also provides rigorous privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary side information.
An important tool in statistical inference is two-sample testing, in which samples from two probability distributions are compared in order to test the null hypothesis that the two underlying distributions are identical against the general alternative that they are different. In this paper, we focus on nonparametric, kernel-based two-sample testing approach and investigate the utility of this framework in a differentially private setting. The kernel-based two-sample testing was introduced by Gretton et al [13, 14] who considers an estimator of maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) [3] , the distance between embeddings of probability measures in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) (See [24] for a recent review), as a test statistic for the nonparametric two-sample problem.
Many existing differentially private testing methods are based on categorical data, i.e. counts [11, 12, 26] , in which case a natural way to achieve privacy is simply adding noise to these counts. However, when we consider a more general input space X , the amount of noise needed to privatise the data essentially becomes the order of diameter of the input space (Details in the Appendix D). For spaces such as R d , the noise that needs to be added can destroy the utility of the data, and hence also for the test. Hence, we take an alternative approach, and privatise only quantities that are required for the test, as in general we require less noise for the differential privacy of summary statistics of the data. For testing, we only require the empirical kernel embedding 1 n i k(x i , ·) corresponding to a dataset, where x i ∈ X and k is some positive definite kernel (discussed in Appendix C.1). Now, since kernel embedding lives in H k , a space of functions, a natural way to protect them is to add Gaussian Process noise [18] . Although sufficient for situations where the functions themselves are of interest, embeddings impaired by a Gaussian process does not lie in the same RKHS [28] , and hence one cannot estimate RKHS distances between such noisy embeddings. Alternatively, one could consider adding noise to an estimator of MMD [14] . However, asymptotic null distributions of these estimators are data dependent and the test thresholds are typically computed by permutation testing or by eigendecomposing centred kernel matrices of the data [15] . In this case neither of these approaches is available in a differentially private setting as they both require further access to data.
In this paper, we build a differentially private two-sample testing framework, by considering analytic representations of probability measures [5, 21] aimed at large scale testing scenarios. As a result, we are able to obtain a test statistic that is based on means and covariance of feature vectors of the data. Here, the asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis of the test statistic does not depend on the data, making this framework a convenient choice for differential privacy. With this setup, we will consider two approaches: 1) add noise to these mean or covariances 2) add noise to the statistic itself.
We now present the two privacy scenarios that we consider and also motivate their usage. In the first scenario, we assume there is a trusted curator and also an untrusted tester, in which we want to protect data from. In this setting, the trusted curator has access to the two datasets and computes the mean and covariance of the empirical differences between the feature vectors. The curator can protect the data in two different ways: (1) perturb mean and covariance separately and release them; or (2) compute the statistic without perturbations and add noise to it directly. The tester takes these perturbed quantities and performs the test at a desired significance level. Here, we separate the entities of truster and curator, as it is rarely that a non-private decision whether to reject or not is of interest, for example tester may require test-statistic/pvalues for multiple hypothesis testing corrections. In the second scenario, we assume that there are two data-owners, each having one data sample, and a tester, and none of the parties trust each other. Each data-owner now has to perturbs their own mean and covariance of the feature vectors and release them to the tester.
Under each setting, we exploit various differentially private mechanisms and empirically study the utility of the proposed framework. In particular, we demonstrate that while the asymptotic null distributions remain unchanged under the differentially private scenario, extra caution needs to be exercised when resorting to such asymptotics. Unlike the non-private case, using the asymptotic null distribution to compute p-values can lead to grossly miscalibrated Type I control. We propose a remedy for this problem, and give approximations of the finite-sample null distributions, yielding good Type I control and power-privacy tradeoffs experimentally in Sec. 6.
While there are several works that connect kernel methods with differential privacy, including [2, 18, 20] , this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to make the kernel-based two-sample testing procedure differentially private.
We start by providing a brief background on kernel two-sample test using analytic representation and on differential privacy and introduce the two privacy settings we consider in this paper in Sec. 2. We derive essential tools for the proposed test in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4, and describe approximations to finite-sample null distributions in Sec. 5. We illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithm in Sec. 6.
Background
In this section, we provide background information on kernel two-sample test using analytic representation and the definition of algorithmic privacy that we will use in our algorithm.
Mean embedding and smooth characteristic function tests First introduced by [5] and then extended and further analyzed by [21] , these two tests are state-of-the-art kernel-based testing approaches applicable to large datasets. Here, we will focus on the approach by [21] , and in particular on the mean embedding (ME) and on characterization based on the smooth characteristic function (SCF). Assume that we observe samples {x i } n i=1 ∼ P and {y i } n i=1 ∼ Q, where P and Q are some probability measures on R D . We wish to test the null hypothesis H 0 : P = Q against all alternatives. Both ME and SCF tests consider finite-dimensional feature representations of the empirical measures P n and Q n corresponding to the samples {x i } n i=1 ∼ P and {y i } n i=1 ∼ Q respectively. The ME test considers feature representation given by
J , for a given set of test locations {T j } J j=1 , i.e. it evaluates the kernel mean embedding 1 n n i=1 k(x i , ·) of P n at those locations. We write w n = φ Pn − φ Qn to be the difference of the feature vectors of the empirical measures P n and Q n . If we write
where, as [21] suggest, a regularization term γ n I is added onto the empirical covariance matrix for numerical stability. This regularization parameter will also play an important role in analyzing sensitivity of this statistic in a differentially private setting. Following [21, Theorem 2], one should take γ n → 0 as n → ∞, and in particular, γ n should decrease at a rate of O(n −1/4 ). The SCF setting uses the statistic of the same form, but considers features based on empirical characteristic functions [25] .
Thus, it suffices to set z i ∈ R J to
j=1 is a given set of frequencies, and g is a given function which has an effect of smoothing the characteristic function estimates (cf. [5] for derivation). The test then proceeds in the same way. For both the cases, the distribution of the test statistic (1) under the null hypothesis H 0 : P = Q converges to a chisquared distribution with J degrees of freedom. This follows from a central limit theorem argument whereby √ nw n converges in law to a zero-mean multivariate normal distribution N (0, Σ) where Σ = E[zz ], while Σ n + γ n I → Σ in probability.
While [5] uses random distribution features, i.e. test locations/frequencies {T j } j are sampled randomly from a predefined distribution, [21] selects test locations/frequencies {T j } j which maximize the test power, yielding interpretable differences between the distributions under consideration. Throughout the paper, we assume that we use bounded kernels in the ME test, in particular k(x, y) ≤ κ/2, ∀x, y, and that the weighting function in the SCF test is also bounded:
Differential privacy Given an algorithm M and neighbouring datasets D, D differing by a single entry, the privacy loss of an outcome o is
A weaker version of the above is ( , δ)-DP, if and only if |L (o) | ≤ , with probability at least 1 − δ. The definition states that a single individual's participation in the data do not change the output probabilities by much, which limits the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one individual.
A way of designing differentially private algorithms is by adding noise to the algorithms' outputs. Suppose a deterministic function h : D → R p computed on sensitive data D outputs a p-dimensional vector quantity. For making h private, we add noise in function h [6] which is calibrated to the global sensitivity, GS h , of function h defined by the maximum difference in terms of L 2 -norm, ||h(D) − h(D )|| 2 , for neighboring D and D . In the case of Gaussian mechanism (Theorem 3.22 in [8] ), the output is perturbed by ;h(D) = 
The perturbed functionh(D) is ( , δ)-DP, where σ ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ)/ , for ∈ (0, 1). In Sec. 3, we exploit several existing differentially private mechanisms to achieve differentially private test statistics.
When constructing our tests, we use two important properties of differential privacy. The composability theorem [6] tells us that the strength of privacy guarantee degrades with repeated use of DP-algorithms. In particular, when two differentially private subroutines are combined, where each one guarantees ( 1 , δ 1 )-DP and ( 2 , δ 2 )-DP respectively by adding independent noise, the parameters are simply composedby ( 1 + 2 , δ 1 + δ 2 ). Furthermore, post-processing invariance [6] tells us that the composition of any arbitrary dataindependent mapping with an ( , δ)-DP algorithm is also ( , δ)-DP.
Privacy settings
We consider the two different privacy settings as shown in Fig. 1 : (A) Trusted-curator (TC) setting: there is a trusted entity called curator that handles datasets and outputs the private test statistic, either in terms of perturbedw n andΣ n , or in terms of perturbed test statistics n . An untrusted tester performs a chi-square test given these quantities. n . An untrusted tester performs a chi-squared test given these quantities.
Trusted-curator setting
In this setting, a trusted curator releases either a private test statistic or private mean and covariance which a tester can use to perform a chi-square test. Given a total privacy budget ( , δ), when we perturb mean and covariance separately, we spend ( 1 , δ 1 ) for mean perturbation and ( 2 , δ 2 ) for covariance perturbation, such that = 1 + 2 and δ = δ 1 + δ 2 .
Perturbing mean and covariance
Mean perturbation We obtain a private mean by adding Gaussian noise based on the analytic Gaussian mechanism recently proposed in [1] . The main reason for using this Gaussian mechanism over the original [8] is that it provides a DP guarantee with smaller noise. For w n : D → R J that has the global L2-sensitivity GS 2 (w n ), the analytic Gaussian mechanism producesw n (D) = w n (D) + n, where n∼N (0 J , σ
Thenw n (D) is ( 1 , δ 1 )-differentially private mean vector if σ n follows the regime in Theorem 9 of [8] 1 , here implicitly σ n depends on GS 2 (w n ), 1 and δ 1 . Assuming an entry difference between two paris of datasets
Covariance perturbation To obtain a private covariance, we consider [9] which utilises Gaussian noise.
Here since the covariance matrix is given by Σ n = Λ − n n−1 w n w n , where Λ = 1 n−1 n i=1 z i z i , we can simply privatize the covariance by simply perturbing the 2nd-moment matrix Λ and using the private meanw n , i.e.,Σ n =Λ − n n−1w nw n . To construct the 2nd-moment matrixΛ that is ( 2 , δ 2 )-differentially private, we useΛ = Λ + Ψ, where Ψ is obtained as follows:
, where β is a function of global sensitivity GS(Λ), 2 , δ 2 , outlined in Theorem A.1 in the appendix.
2. Construct an upper triangular matrix (including diagonal) with entries from η.
3. Copy the upper part to the lower part so that resulting matrix Ψ becomes symmetric. Now using the composability theorem [6] gives us thatΣ n is ( , δ)-differentially private.
Perturbing test statistic
The trusted-curator can also release a differentially private statistic, to do this we use the analytic Gaussian mechanism as before, perturbing the statistic by adding Gaussian noise. To use the mechanism, we need to calculate the global sensitivity needed of the test statistic s n = w n (Σ n + γ n I) −1 w n , which we provide in this Theorem(proof can be found in Appendix B):
Theorem 3.1. Given the definitions of w n and Λ n , and the L2-norm bound on z i 's, the global sensitivity
n−1 , where γ n is a regularization parameter.which we set to be smaller than the smallest eigenvalue of Λ.
No-trusted-entity setting
In this setting, the two samples {x i } nx i=1 ∼ P and {y j } ny j=1 ∼ Q reside with different data owners each of which wish to protect their samples in a differentially private manner. Note that in this context we allow the size of each sample to be different. The data owners first need to agree on the given kernel k as well as on the test locations {T j } J j=1 . We denote now z
in the case of the SCF test. Also, we denote w ny are computed by their data owners, which then impair them independently with noise according to the sensitivity analysis described in Section 3.1. As a result we obtain differentially private means and covariancesw
nx at their respective users. All these quantities are then released to the tester whose role is to compute the test statistic and the corresponding p-value. In particular, the tester uses the statistic given bỹ s nx,ny = n x n y n x + n y (w 1 We utilise the author's code available at https://github.com/BorjaBalle/analytic-gaussian-mechanism
Analysis of null distributions
In the previous sections, we discussed necessary tools to make the kernel two sample tests private in two different settings by considering sensitivity analysis of quantities of interest. 2 . In this section, we consider the distributions of the test statistics under the null hypothesis P = Q for each of the two privacy settings.
Trusted-curator setting: perturbed mean and covariance
In this scheme, noise is added both to the mean vector w n and to the covariance matrix Σ n (by dividing the privacy budget between these two quantities). Let us denote the perturbed mean byw n and perturbed covariance withΣ n . The noisy version of the test statistics n is then given bỹ
where γ n is a regularization parameter just like in the non-private statistic (1). We show below that the asymptotic null distribution (as sample size n → ∞) of this private test statistic is in fact identical to that of the non-private test statistic. Intuitively, this is to be expected: as the number of samples increases, the contribution to the aggregate statistics of any individual observation diminishes, and the variance of the added noise goes to zero.
Theorem 5.1. Assuming the Gausssian noise forw n with the sensitivity bound in (2) and the perturbation mechanism introduced in Section 3.1 forΣ n ,s n and s n converge to the same limit in distribution, as n → ∞.
Proof is provided in Appendix F. Based on the Theorem, it is tempting to ignore the additive noise and rely on the asymptotic null distribution. However, as demonstrated in Sec. 6, such tests have an inflated number of false positives. We propose a non-asymptotic regime in order to improve approximations of the null distribution when computing the test threshold. In particular, recall that we previously relied on √ nw n converging to a zero-mean multivariate normal distribution N (0, Σ), with Σ = E[zz ] [5] . In the private setting, we will also approximate the distribution of √ nw n with a multivariate normal, but consider explicit non-asymptotic covariances which appear in the test statistic. Namely, the covariance of √ nw n is Σ + nσ 2 n I and its mean is 0, so we will approximate its distribution by N (0, Σ + nσ 2 n I). The test statistic can be understood as a squared norm of the vector
n . Under the normal approximation to √ nw n and by treatingΣ n as fixed (note that this is a quantity released to the tester),
n is another multivariate normal, i.e. N (0, C), where C = (Σ n + γ n I) −1/2 (Σ + nσ 2 n I)(Σ n + γ n I) −1/2 . The overall statistic thus follows a distribution given by a weighted sum J j=1 λ j χ 2 j of independent chi-squared distributed random variables, with the weights λ j given by the eigenvalues of C. Note that this approximation to the null distribution depends on a non-private true covariance Σ. While that is clearly not available to the tester, we propose to simply replace this quantity with the privatized empirical covariance, i.e.Σ n , so that the tester approximates the null distribution with J j=1λ j χ 2 j , whereλ j are the eigenvalues of
τj +γn , where {τ j } are the eigenvalues ofΣ n (note thatλ j → 1 as n → ∞ recovering back the asymptotic null). This approach, while a heuristic, gives a correct Type I control and good power performance, unlike the approach which relies on the asymptotic null distribution and ignores the presence of privatizing noise.
Trusted-curator setting: perturbed test statistic
In this section, we will consider how directly perturbing the test statistic impacts the null distribution. To achieve private test statistics, we showed that we can simply use add Gaussian noise 3 using the analytic Gaussian mechanism, described in Section 3.2.
Similarly to Theorem 5.1, we have a similar theorem below, which says that the perturbed statistic then has the same asymptotic null distribution as the original statistic.
Theorem 5.2. Using the noise variance σ 2 η ( , δ, n) defined by the upper bound in Theorem 3.1,s n and s n converge to the same limit in distribution, as n → ∞.
The proof follows immediately from σ η ( , δ, n) → 0, as n → ∞. As in the case of perturbed mean and covariance, we consider approximating the null distribution with the sum of the chi-squared with J degrees of freedom and a normal N (0, σ 2 η ( , δ, n)), i.e., the distribution of the true statistic is approximated with its asymptotic version, whereas we use exact non-asymptotic distribution of the added noise. The test threshold can then easily be computed by a Monte Carlo test which repeatedly simulates the sum of these two random variables. It is important to note that since σ 2 η ( , δ, n) is independent of the data (as shown in Appendix B), an untrusted tester can simulate the approximate null distribution without compromising privacy.
No-trusted-entity setting
Similarly as in section 5.1, as n x , n y → ∞ such that n x /n y → ρ ∈ (0, 1), asymptotic null distribution of this test statistic remains unchanged as in the non-private setting, i.e. it is the chi-squared distribution with J degrees of freedom. However, by again considering the non-asymptotic case and applying a chi-squared approximation, we get improved power and type I control. In particular, the test statistic is close to a weighted sum J j=1 λ j χ 2 j of independent chi-square distributed random variables, with the weights λ j given by the eigenvalues of C = nxny nx+ny (Σ nx,ny + γ n I)
where Σ x and Σ y are the true covariances within each of the samples, σ 
Similarly as in the trusted-curator setting, we demonstrate that this corrected approximation to the null distribution leads to significant improvements in power and Type I control.
Experiments
Here we demonstrate the effectiveness of our private kernel two-sample test on both synthetic and real problems, for testing H 0 : P = Q. The total sample size is denoted by N and the number of test set samples by n. We set the significance level to α = 0.01. Unless specified otherwise use the isotropic Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth θ and fix the number of test locations to J = 5. Under the trusted-curator (TC) setting, we use 20% of the samples N as an independent training set to optimize the test locations and θ using gradient descent as in [21] . Under the no-trusted-entity (NTE) setting, we randomly sample J locations and calculate the median heuristic bandwidth [16] from the training set.
For all our experiments, we average them over 500 runs, where each run repeats the simulation or randomly samples without replacement from the data set. We then report the empirical estimate of P(s n > T α ), computed by proportion of times the statistics n is greater than the T α , where T α is the test threshold provided by the corresponding approximation to the null distribution. We fix the regularization parameter γ to 0.001 for the TC under perturbed test statistics (TCS). In TCMC and NTE, given the privacy budget of ( , δ), we use (0.5 , 0.5δ) to perturb the mean and covariance seperately. We compare these to its non-private counterpart ME and SCF. More experimental details and experiments can be found in Appendix E.
Synthetic data
We demonstrate our tests on 4 separate synthetic problems, namely, Same Gaussian (SG), Gaussian mean difference (GMD), Gaussian variance difference (GVD) and Blobs, with the specifications of P and Q sum- Varying n with = 2.5. Here *-asym represents using the asymptotic χ 2 null distribution, while *-samp represents sampling locations and using the median heuristic bandwidth. marized in Table. 2. The same experimental setup was used in [21] . For the Blobs dataset, we use the SCF approach as the baseline, and also the basis for our algorithms, since [5, 21] showed that SCF outperforms the ME test here.
Varying privacy level
We now fix the test sample size n to be 10 000, and vary between 0 and 5 with a fixed δ = 1e − 5. The results are shown in the top row of Figure 2 . For SG dataset, where H 0 : P = Q is true, we can see that if one simply applies the asymptotic null distribution of a χ 2 on top, we will obtain a massively inflated type I error. This is however not the case for TCMC, TCS and NTE, where the type I error is approximately controlled at the right level, this is shown more clearly in Figure 5 in the Appendix. In GMD, GVD and Blobs dataset, the null hypothesis does not hold, and we see that our algorithms indeed discover this difference. As expected we observe a trade-off between privacy level and also power, for increasing privacy (decreasing ), we have less power. These experiments also reveals the order of performance of these algorithms, i.e. TCS > TCMC > NTE. This is not surprising, as for TCMC and NTE, we are pertubing the mean and covariance separately, rather than the statistic directly, which is the direct quantity we want to protect.
The power analysis for the SVD and Blobs dataset also reveal the interesting nature of sampling versus optimisation in our two settings. In the SVD dataset, we observe that NTE performs better than TCS and TCMC, however if we use the same test locations and bandwidth of NTE for TCS and TCMC, the order of performance is as we expect, better for sampling over optimization. However, in the Blobs dataset, we observe that NTE has little or no power, because this dataset is sensitive to the choice of test frequency locations, highlighting the importance of optimisation in this case.
Varying test sample size n We now fix = 2.5, δ = 1.0 −5 and vary n from 1000 to 15 000. The results are shown in the bottom row of Figure 2 . The results for the SG dataset further reinforce the importance of not simply using the asymptotic null distribution, as even at very large sample size, the type I error is still inflated when naively computing the test threshold form a chi-squared distribution. This is not the case for TCMC, TCS and NTE, where the type I error is approximately controlled at the correct level for all sample sizes, as shown in Figure 5 . [5, 17, 21] . I100) N ((1, 0, . . . , 0) (2, 1, . . . , 1)) Figure 4 : Blobs data sampled from P on the left and blobs data sampled from Q in the right.
Real data: Celebrity age data
We now demonstrate our tests on a real life celebrity age dataset, namely the IMDb-WIKI dataset [27], containing 397 949 images of 19 545 celebrities and their corresponding age labels. Here, we will follow the preprocessing of [23] , and use this to construct two datasets, under25 and 25to35. Here the under25 dataset is the images where the corresponding celebrity's bag label is < 25, and the 25to35 dataset is the images corresponding to the celebrity's bag label that is between 25 and 35. The dataset under25 contains 58095 images, and the dataset 25to35 contains 126415 images. For this experiment, we will focus on using the ME version of the test and consider the kernel
where ϕ(x) : R 256×256 → R 4096 is the feature map learnt by the CNN in [27] , mapping the image in the original pixel space to the last layer. For our experiment, we take N = 3125, and use 20% of the data for sampling test locations, and calculation of the median heuristic bandwidth. Note here we do not perform optimization, due to the large dimension of the feature map ϕ. We now perform two tests, for one test we compare samples from under25 only (i.e. H 0 : P = Q holds), and the other we compares samples from under25 to samples from 25to35 (i.e. H 0 : P = Q does not hold). The results are shown in Figure 3 for from 0.1 to 0.7. We observe that in the under25 only test, the TCMC, TCS and NTE all achieve the correct Type I error rate, this is unlike their counterpart that uses the χ 2 asymptotic null distribution. In the under25 vs 25to35 two sample test, we see that our algorithms achieve maximal power at a high level of privacy, protecting the original images from malicious intent.
CONCLUSION
While kernel-based hypothesis testing provides flexible statistical tools for data analysis, its utility in differentially private settings is not well understood. We investigated differentially private kernel-based two-sample testing procedures, by making use of the sensitivity bounds on the quantities used in the test statistics. While asymptotic null distributions for the modified procedures remain unchanged, ignoring additive noise can lead to an inflated number of false positives. Thus, we propose new approximations of the null distributions under the private regime which give correct Type I control and good power-privacy tradeoffs, as demonstrated in extensive numerical evaluations. 
, Cauchy Schwarz and IV, (10)
, due to inequality III.
Here, the regularization parameter λ n is the lower bound on the minimum singular values of the matrices Λ and M λ . Hence the final sensiitvity of the data can be upper bound by
n−1 . The inequalities we used are given by
• I: Due to the ShermanMorrison formula, we can re-write
Now, we can bound
where the last line is due to
≥ 0, and
Let a = w n Λ −1 w n and b = w n Λ −1 w n , then:
and then we have that:
• II: For a positive semi-definite Σ, 0 ≤ m Σm ≤ m 2 2 Σ F , where Σ F is the Frobenius norm.
• III: We here will denoteṽ = n n−1 v andṽ = n n−1 v . Due to the ShermanMorrison formula,
For any eigenvectors u j , u k of M M, we have
where µ j , µ k are corresponding eigenvalues. Now, we rewrite the Frobenius norm as (since it is invariant under any orthogonal matrix, so we take the one formed by the eigenvectors from M M with this property):
Note that we can get equation 26 by noticing that:
We write w n Λ −1 w n = Λ −1/2 w n Λ −1/2 w n and similarly w n Λ −1 w n = Λ −1/2 w n Λ −1/2 w n .
.
where the last equality comes from that Λ is real and symmetric.
C Other Possible Ways to Make the Test Private C.1 Perturbing the Kernel Mean in RKHS
In [4] , the authors proposed a new way to make the solution of the regularized risk minimization differentially private by injecting the noise in objective itself. That is :
However, it is not an easy task to add perturbation in functional spaces. The authors in [18] proposes to add a sample path from gaussian processes into the function to make it private.
Lemma C.1 (Proposition 7 [18] ). Let G be a sample path of a Gaussian process having mean zero and covariance function k. Let K denote the Gram matrix i.e.
. Let {f D : D ∈ D} be a family of functions indexed by databases. Then the release of :
is (α, β)-differentially private (with respect to the cylinder σ-field F ) where ∆ is the upper bound on
and c(β) ≥ 2 log 2 β .
Now, we consider the optimization problem given for MMD and inject noise in the objective itself. The optimization problem then becomes :
In the similar way, one get the empirical version of the perturbed MMD distance just by replacing the true expectation with the empirical one. The problem with a construction above where embedding is injected with a Gaussian process sample path with the same kernel k is that the result will not be in the corresponding RKHS H k for infinite-dimensional spaces (these are well known results known as Kallianpur's 0/1 laws), and thus MMD cannot be computed, i.e. while f D is in the RKHS,f D need not be. This has for example been considered in Bayesian models for kernel embeddings [10] , where an alternative kernel construction using convolution is given by:
where ν is a finite measure. Such smoother kernel r ensures that the sample path from a GP (0, r) will be in the RKHS H k . The key property in [18] is Prop. 8, which shows that for any h ∈ H k and for any finite collection of points x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ):
which implies that we only require sup D∼D f D − f D H k ≤ ∆ to hold to upper bound (26). However, in nonparametric contexts like MMD, one usually considers permutation testing approaches. But this is not possible in the case of private testing as one would need to release the samples from the null distribution.
C.2 Adding χ 2 -noise to the Test Statistics
Since the unperturbed test statistics follows the χ 2 distribution under the null, hence it is again natural to think to add noise sampled from the chi-square distribution to the test statistics s n . The probability density function for chi-square distribution with k−degree of freedom is given as :
, if x ≥ 0..
0,
otherwise.
For k = 2, we simply have
, if x ≥ 0. As we have been given s n = nw n Σ −1 n w n which essentially depends on z i ∀i ∈ [n]. Now, we define s n which differs from s n at only one sample i.e. s n depends on z 1 , · · · z i , · · · z n .We denote ∆ = s n − s n . The privacy guarantee is to bound the following term :
Hence, we get the final privacy guarantee by equation (29) . But the problem to this approach that since the support for chi-square distributions are limited to positive real numbers. Hence the distribution in the numerator and denominator in the equation (29) might have different support which essentially makes the privacy analysis almost impossible in the vicinity of zero and beyond. Hence, to hold equation (29), x 0 must be greater than s n − s n for all two neighbouring dataset which essentially implies x 0 > GS 2 (s n ). Hence, we get no privacy guarantee at all when the test statistics lies very close to zero.
However, proposing alternate null distribution is simple in this case. As sum of two chi-square random variable is still a chi-square with increased degree of freedom. Let X 1 and X 2 denote 2 independent random variables that follow these chi-square distributions : r 2 ) . Hence, the perturbed statistics will follow chi-square random variable with J + 2 degree of freedom.
C.3 Adding Noise to Σ −1/2 n w n One might also achieve the goal to make test statistics private by adding gaussian noise in the quantity √ nΣ −1/2 n w n and finally taking the 2−norm of the perturbed quantity. As we have done the sentitivity analysis of w n Σ −1 w n in the theorem 3.1, the sensitivity analysis of √ nΣ −1/2 w n can be done in very similar way. Again from the application of slutsky's theorem, we can see that asymptotically the perturbed test statistics will converge to the true one. However, similar to section 5, we approximate it with the other null distribution which shows more power experimentally under the noise as well. Suppose we have to add the noise η ∼ N (0, σ 2 ( , δ n )) in the Σ −1/2 n w n to make the statistics s n private. The noisy statistics is then can be written ass
Eventually,s n can bewritten as the following :
w n where
w n is a 2J dimensional vector. The corresponding covariance matrixΣ n is an identity matrix I 2J of dimension 2J × 2J. Hence, under the null Σ −1/2 n w n ∼ N (0, I 2J ). We define one more matrix which we call as A which is
By definition matrix A is a symmetric matrix which essentially means that there exist a matrix H such that H AH = diag(λ 1 , λ 2 · · · λ r ) where H H = HH = I J . Now if we consider a random variable N 2 ∼ N (0, I 2 J) and N 1 = HN 2 then following holds asymptotically :
As a short remark, we would like to mention that the in this approach the weights for the weighted sum of χ 2 -random variable are not directly dependent on the data which is essentially a good thing from the privacy point of view. Sensitivity of Σ −1/2 n w n can be computed in a similar way as in Theorem 3.1.
D Perturbed Samples Interpretation of Private Mean and CoVariance
In order to define differential privacy, we need to define two neighbouring dataset D and D . Let us consider some class of databases D N where each datset differ with another at just one data point. Let us also assume that each database carries n data points of dimension d each. Now if we privately want to release data then we consider a function f : D N → R nd which simply takes all n data points of the database and vertically stack them in one large vector of dimension nd. It is not hard to see now that : Baseline-ME TCMC-ME NTE-ME TCS-ME Baseline-SCF TCMC-SCF NTE-SCF TCS-SCF 
. According to Slutsky's theorem, √ nw n and √ nw n thus converge to the same limit in distribution, which under the null hypothesis is N (0, Σ), with Σ = E zz . Similarly, the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix corresponding to the Wishart noise to be added in Σ n are also of the order O( 1 n ) which implies thatΣ n + γ n I and Σ n + γ n I converge to the same limit, i.e. Σ. Therefore,s n converges in distribution to the same limit as the non-private test statistic, i.e. a chi-squared random variable with J degrees of freedom. 
